Canada has long prided itself on being a champion of human rights abroad. But according to a blunt new U.S. trade report, when it comes to actually stopping goods made with forced labour from crossing its borders, the country has been asleep at the wheel and Washington is running out of patience.
The United States Trade Representative published findings on June 2 from an investigation it launched in March, concluding that 60 of America’s trading partners Canada among them have failed to adequately stop forced labour goods from reaching U.S. markets through back-door channels. For Canada and 15 other countries including Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, the proposed penalty is an additional 10 percent tariff. A steeper 12.5 percent levy is proposed for countries like China, India, and Japan.
The timing is pointed. Canada and the United States are less than a month out from a pivotal July 1 review of the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement the very trade deal that, ironically, already obligates Canada to keep forced labour goods out.
The USTR’s argument is not that Canada lacks a law it’s that Canada doesn’t use it. The country amended its Customs Tariff back in March 2020 to prohibit goods “mined, manufactured or produced wholly or in part by forced labour.” That change came into effect before CUSMA launched in July 2020, meaning Canada has been legally bound to enforce the ban for nearly six years.
The numbers tell the story. According to Canadian statistics, the Canada Border Services Agency the body responsible for enforcement detained just 48 shipments suspected of containing forced labour goods between 2020 and late 2025. Of those, only two were ever denied entry: a shipment of textile products in 2024, and a batch of frozen seafood in 2025. Both originated from China.
The contrast with U.S. enforcement is stark. American customs authorities turned away nearly 23,000 shipments suspected of containing forced labour goods over a comparable period under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. The USTR report did not mince words: Canada’s enforcement record is “minimal.”
The report also took aim at the CBSA for what it described as a lack of transparency, noting the agency “does not appear to publish official statistics or other information regarding its enforcement efforts.” The CBSA has defended its case-by-case approach, noting that unlike U.S. law, Canadian legislation does not allow officers to ban goods solely on the basis of where they come from even if that region is known for forced labour practices.
Beyond the enforcement gap, the USTR raised concerns about Canada’s passive posture toward known risks. The report cites a 2025 finding by the Coalition Against Forced Labour in Trade, which concluded that Canada’s weak enforcement has effectively made it a destination of choice for tainted goods. Seafood from Thailand, coffee from Brazil, cocoa from Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, and cotton-based clothing are among the products flagged as carrying a “known risk” of forced labour all present in Canadian markets.
Mehmet Tohti, executive director of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project, has been even more direct, calling Canada “officially a dumping ground for the products made by the use of Uyghur forced labour.” His remarks echo a broader concern that Canadian supply chains remain dangerously porous to goods produced in Xinjiang, where Global Affairs Canada itself acknowledged in 2021 that evidence points to forced labour of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities not just in the region, but across China. Ottawa followed that assessment with sanctions against Chinese officials in December 2024.
A Harvard University report from April this year identified two measures as central to an effective forced labour import ban: a public list of high-risk entities, and a rebuttable presumption standard that places the burden of proof on importers. Canada, the USTR found, has neither.
Prime Minister Mark Carney struck a measured tone when the tariff proposals landed. Speaking to reporters on June 3, he said the announcement was “not a surprise,” noting the U.S. had signalled it for months. He assured Canadians that the vast majority of Canadian exports would remain protected under CUSMA, and that Canada holds “the best trade deal of any of the U.S. trade counterparts.” He also acknowledged without much elaboration that some existing measures had proven “not as effective” as intended, and pledged that his government would bring new proposals to the House of Commons within weeks.
Trade Minister Dominic LeBlanc, who met with USTR chief Jamieson Greer on the same day the report dropped, echoed those assurances on social media. He pointed to a CUSMA carve-out in the proposed tariffs as protection for much of Canadian trade, while promising legislation this month to strengthen Canada’s forced labour framework. “We share the United States’ objective,” LeBlanc wrote, “and we will be engaging constructively with them over the coming weeks.”
The opposition has been less measured. Conservative MP Michael Chong, the party’s foreign affairs critic, issued a statement calling the proposed tariffs “unjustified,” but reserved his sharpest words for the government’s record. “For six years the Liberal government has continually failed to stop products using forced labour from entering Canada,” he wrote. “This failure is now putting Canadian jobs and trade at risk.” Chong accused Carney of being unable to “speak clearly” on the issue a charge the government would likely dispute, though the enforcement statistics make that rebuttal harder than it might otherwise be.
The USTR has set a timeline for its proposed tariffs: public comments will be accepted through July 6, requests to appear at hearings are due by June 22, and formal hearings are scheduled for July 7. That calendar runs almost exactly parallel to the July 1 CUSMA review putting Canada in the unusual position of simultaneously defending its trade relationship and scrambling to reform the very policies that have put it under scrutiny.
For Canada, the forced labour issue has shifted from being a moral talking point to a concrete trade liability. The path forward new legislation, stronger enforcement, greater transparency at the border is clear enough on paper. Whether Ottawa can move fast enough to satisfy Washington before the next deadline is a much harder question.
