Canada is quietly attempting one of the most significant foreign-policy recalibrations in years. Under Prime Minister Mark Carney, Ottawa is pursuing what it calls “pragmatic engagement” with Asia a diplomatic reset aimed squarely at unlocking economic opportunities in China and India while fencing off the more uncomfortable issues that have long defined these relationships.
On paper, it sounds reasonable. In practice, it’s a tightrope walk.
For the past several years, relations with both Beijing and New Delhi have hit historic lows. Allegations of foreign interference, the fallout from the Meng Wanzhou saga, and the detainment of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in China left deep scars. India, too, has been viewed with suspicion after accusations of extraterritorial repression. Yet the Carney government seems determined to keep these concerns from derailing its economic ambitions.
Meetings with Xi Jinping in South Korea and Narendra Modi in Canada signal a clear shift in tone one that contrasts sharply with Carney’s own rhetoric during the election. Back then, China was cast as Canada’s biggest security threat. Today, it is a “strategic partner.”
This transformation isn’t accidental. It is driven by a core objective: reducing Canada’s heavy dependence on U.S. markets. And for that, access to Asia is indispensable.
Carney’s meeting with Xi was framed as a “turning point,” punctuated by China lifting its ban on group travel to Canada a move that could restore millions in tourism revenue. Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand, fresh from her October trip to China, now openly describes the relationship as a “strategic partnership.” That alone is a remarkable shift, given that Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy labelled China an “increasingly disruptive global power.”
Carney argues that disruption can bring opportunity. China’s dominance in critical minerals and green technology is, from his perspective, both a challenge and a potential pathway for collaboration particularly as Canada seeks to grow its own critical minerals industry. His government is pouring billions into this sector, positioning Canada as a reliable alternative to Chinese supply chains.
Yet this renewed warmth toward Beijing comes with obvious risks. People like Michael Kovrig, who lived through the consequences of diplomatic naiveté, are warning loudly and clearly: dependency on China is never just economic. It becomes leverage. Climate cooperation may sound benign, but in Beijing’s hands, it can quickly turn into a bargaining chip.
The Carney government insists it is “clear-eyed” in its approach that it can raise concerns about foreign interference in private while expanding trade in public. Critics argue this compartmentalization is wishful thinking. China rarely separates economics from politics, and assuming it will do so with Canada borders on naïve.
At the same time, Ottawa is expanding defence partnerships with countries like Indonesia and the Philippines nations that have their own fraught relationships with China. It’s a subtle attempt to balance engagement with deterrence, though Canada’s modest military capabilities limit what it can realistically contribute.
The challenge for Carney is maintaining credibility. His election-era statements painted China as a geopolitical adversary. His current policies frame it as an indispensable partner. Voters and allies alike may wonder: which version does Canada truly believe?
Ultimately, Canada’s pivot is understandable. The global economy is shifting, and avoiding Asia especially China is unrealistic. But pragmatism should not morph into dependence. A foreign policy built on optimism about Beijing’s intentions is one that risks repeating its own history.
Engagement is necessary. Blind faith is not. Carney’s approach could help Canada secure new markets, diversify supply chains, and revive stagnant sectors but only if Ottawa remembers the central lesson of the last decade: China plays a long game, and it plays to win. Canada must be prepared to do the same.
